Hayfin co-founder and CEO Tim Flynn was featured on Private Market Talks providing insight into the Hayfin team’s dynamic, innovative approach to direct lending and leveraged finance. Tim reflected on learnings from his career journey, from starting out as a beekeeper to founding a leading European alternative asset management firm, and how he applies the learnings from each experience to continue to enhance the Hayfin business. He also provides a view on the opportunities and challenges he sees within the private markets, and how these are informing Hayfin’s strategy.
Hayfin today announces that it has participated in the financing to support Bridgepoint’s acquisition of French residential property management services company Nexity ADB from its parent company Nexity Group.
Nexity Group is France’s largest publicly listed real estate developer. The carve-out of the residential property management services division will provide Nexity ADB with a stronger platform to grow the business as a standalone company.
Alban Senlis, Head of Hayfin Private Credit in France, commented: “We are pleased to be partnered with Bridgepoint, who have deep expertise and an outstanding track record in the sector. This is a highly attractive investment to Hayfin given the company’s solid and resilient trading performance, as well as its potential for further growth as an independent business with the right level of funding behind it. We look forward to working with our new partners as Nexity ABD embarks on its next phase of growth.”
Disclaimer: Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. No investment, strategy or tested process can guarantee results. Please note, fees reduce returns to investors.
Hayfin today announces that it has appointed Michaela Campbell as a Managing Director in its Private Credit team.
Michaela will be responsible for overseeing the team’s portfolio monitoring and risk profile across new and existing investments. She will be based in Hayfin’s headquarters in London and work closely with Portfolio Manager and Co-Head of Direct Lending, Mark Bickerstaffe and Portfolio Manager and Co-Head of Direct Lending, Marc Chowrimootoo.
Michaela’s appointment comes as Hayfin continues to deploy significant capital through its flagship private credit strategy, having last year exceeded its €6 billion target fundraise for Hayfin Direct Lending Fund IV. Recent investments across Hayfin’s private credit strategies include loans supporting IK Partners’ acquisition of French fire safety company Eurofeu Group and Näder Holdings’ repurchase of a minority stake in leading global orthotics company Ottobock.
Prior to joining Hayfin, Michaela spent five years at BlackRock in the Risk and Quantitative Analytics team and most recently served as co-head of global investment risk for Private Credit and Private Equity. Before joining BlackRock, she worked at GE Capital for more than a decade, where she held several roles in London and Abu Dhabi with a focus on underwriting, portfolio management and restructuring of leveraged loans. She earned a BSc degree in statistics and actuarial science from the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg and is a CFA Charter holder.
Mark Bickerstaffe said: “We are delighted to welcome Michaela to Hayfin as a new Managing Director in the private credit team. She brings with her a wealth of directly transferable skills and insight from her previous roles. Michaela joins Hayfin at an exciting time as we look to capitalise on the recent increase of institutional asset allocation towards private credit in Europe and build on our recent private financing success across the continent. Establishing a specialised portfolio monitoring team is an important step for us as we continue to grow the capacity and ambition of our Private Credit strategy.”
Michaela Campbell said: “Hayfin has experienced remarkable growth in recent years and has consistently proven that it can deploy capital at scale and at speed, whilst maintaining a conservative risk profile. Its unparalleled network and connections across the European market are equally impressive. I look forward to working alongside my new colleagues and industry partners across Hayfin’s Private Credit strategy.”
Hayfin’s core private credit strategies comprise Direct Lending, through which Hayfin invests in performing loans to primarily European middle-market companies; Tactical Solutions in which the firm has a flexible mandate to pursue opportunistic investments with credit-like risk profiles at enhanced returns; and Special Opportunities, where it invests flexibly in a range of unique opportunities across industries, markets and sub-strategies in situations where financing may be scarce.
Disclaimer: Past affiliations are not a reflection of current capabilities and past performance is not an indication of future results.
Within the European private equity secondaries market, single-asset GP-led transactions are anticipated to double, if not triple, in volume in the next three to five years. Hayfin’s Mirja Lehmler-Brown sits down with Private Equity International to discuss the attractive dynamics within the current market, as well as its expected evolution over the coming years.
Read the full commentary below.
Hayfin today announces that it has signed a contract with Oshima Shipbuilding and Sumisho Marine to construct two new-build 100,000-DWT Post-Panamax dry bulk carrier ships. The vessels, once constructed, will be deliver to an international energy trader on a long-term charter. The project will be funded through Hayfin’s Maritime Yield strategy and underlines the firm’s commitment to the Japanese shipping market, as both an asset-owner and long-term charter provider. The vessels will be managed by Hayfin’s in-house ship management platform, Greenheart Shipping.
The vessels will be constructed at Oshima Shipyard in the Nagasaki Prefecture of south-western Japan and completion is expected to take place within 2026. The vessels will be built to world-leading standards of quality and fuel efficiency, differentiating them from the majority of the current global Panamax fleet that is expected to be non-compliant with International Maritime Organisation sustainability regulations in three years’ time. With just two Japanese shipyards currently building Post-Panamax vessels, contributing to a historically low global orderbook, Hayfin was able to secure these two highly sought-after slots at one of the world’s leading dry bulk specialists through its longstanding relationships with key stakeholders in the Japanese market.
Andreas Povlsen, Head of Maritime at Hayfin, said: “This transaction is another sign of our firm commitment to the Japanese market and demonstrates the kind of attractive asset exposure we can offer to investors through our Maritime Yield strategy; combining fuel-efficient assets and long-term charters to investment-grade counterparties against a supportive long-term market backdrop with consistent tonne-mile growth and a fleet in urgent need of renewal.”
Hayfin recently announced a successful fundraise for its Maritime Yield strategy, equipping the firm with the capacity to acquire $1 billion in shipping assets through equity and debt financing, with a focus on top-specification assets that generate predictable and uncorrelated cash yields from blue-chip counterparties. Having been active in Japan since 2015, Hayfin also opened its Tokyo office last year, led by Tomohiro Hosogaya, the firm’s Head of Japan.
Hayfin today announces the continued expansion of its global presence having received in-principle approval to open a new representative office in the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”)*. Through this opening, Hayfin will strengthen its footprint in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
The expansion underscores the firm’s commitment to growing strategically, following the opening of the Tokyo office at the end of 2023. With an established local presence, Hayfin is set to enhance its coverage in the UAE and Middle Eastern markets and consolidate local investor relationships.
The opening of the DIFC office increases Hayfin’s total number of locations to 13 alongside the firm’s headquarters in London and offices in Frankfurt, Madrid, Milan, Munich, New York, Paris, Luxembourg, San Diego, Singapore, Stockholm and Tokyo. Jack Richardson, Principal, Partner Solutions will be permanently based in the DIFC office and will work under the guidance of Camilla Coriani, Managing Director, Partner Solutions who will oversee efforts in the region.
Alex Wolfman, Global Head of Partner Solutions at Hayfin, said: “The DIFC representative office will form a crucial part of Hayfin’s Partner Solutions approach. The combination of our scale, global footprint as well as depth and breadth of our existing relationships is a solid foundation for us to grow within the region.”
*The Dubai Financial Services Authority approval is subject to Hayfin fulfilling criteria within a six-month period.
Guy du Parc Braham
Hayfin’s Chief Risk Officer discusses how UK-EU regulatory divergence will ensure that Brexit remains an important consideration for investors
Thank the Lord! On Christmas Eve, against the run of play, a Brexit deal was struck. The heavens did not fall on New Year’s Day. U2’s eponymous song was right (almost). Cue sighs of relief all round. We can now forget about the awkward portmanteau word that entered the lexicon in 2015 and, after five tortuous years, we can consign it to the dustbin of history, along with the endless, repeated analyses of the impact of Brexit across new invest- ments and the portfolio. If only! Unfortunately, the deal marks the start of Brexit, not its end. While each of the EU and the UK may now view the other in terms of Grillparzer’s image of walking alive in the funeral procession behind one’s own corpse, the reality is that the two entities are unavoidably entangled forever, whatever condition either one finds itself in, dead or alive or somewhere in between. The deal is a modest starting point to a future economic and political relationship – offering tariff- and quota-free trade in goods but subject to complicated rules of origin and patchy mutual recognition of safety and quality standards. Large areas of trade in services (including financial services) were parked and there is only a bridging agreement on cross-border data flow. The two main reasons to keep our analyses fresh lie in the so-called level playing field (LPF) provisions of the agreement and in non-tariff barriers (which can be a greater obstacle to cross-border trade than tariffs as they cause border disruption and certification problems affecting the ability to sell products or services in each other’s jurisdiction, for example in foods, medicines or chemicals).
The key point is that the UK cannot just take its “mark” from exiting the EU – the initial friction costs of a more costly trading relationship – and then do nothing. Boris Johnson’s government needs to deliver some of the prospective benefits of Brexit now that Britain is able to set its own rules, is free from EU regulation and has left the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Change has started in agriculture, replacing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy as the mechanism to support farmers, and it is coming in taxation (the removal of the so-called tampon tax is a small beginning, as VAT is an EU-mandated tax). In time, it will come in new regional support policies (partly supplanting the EU’s structural funds), as a component of the government’s “levelling up” strategy for the North of England; in deregulation or better regulation across a number of industries including financial services, healthcare and bio-sciences; planning reform; infrastructure investment; subsidies for new growth industries; labour and environmental reform; and the lowering of trade barriers with the rest of the world (including reduction of the UK’s WTO tariff schedule). Such change will create the divergence which is intended to be managed via the LPF mechanics of the new deal. It would permit countermeasures (most importantly new tariffs or quotas) to be imposed in sectors where there emerges unfair competition between the UK and EU because of differences in regulation – in particular as a result of labour, social or environmental policies – or state subsidies. And the regime applies both ways – to the EU and UK – as well as where one party decides to increase its domestic costs by tightening regulation (e.g. in raising workers’ rights or environmental standards).
So we will need to watch both how divergence plays out and how the LPF provisions are applied in practice. Britain will want to push divergence to the limit of unfair advantage and the risk is of escalating disputes followed by tit-for-tat retaliation. Any prospect of a material change in regulation or subsidies in a sector in which we at Hayfin are invested, or in which we intend to invest, will mean we have to run the kind of sensitivity analysis in our credit models to which we have become so accustomed these last five years: assessing the impact of a margin squeeze from additional tariffs on cost inputs or on sales, a loss of sales from higher tariffs that cannot be absorbed by the producer or an inability to sell due to non-tariff barriers. We have already learnt elsewhere in our investment history that regulatory risk is easy to underestimate. But this, the potential impact of EU/UK regulatory divergence on trade, is quantifiable at the level of an individual credit. We know how to analyse it and the risk is already on the radar. Regrettably, however, its likelihood means we shan’t be throwing away the Brexit sensitivities that have clogged our files for so long. Their relevance has only just begun. Worse, if the agreement ends up as complicated to operate as it is to read and either side threatens to exercise its right to terminate with twelve months’ notice, it will be Groundhog Day for everyone.
Guy du Parc Braham Hayfin’s Chief Risk Officer discusses the limitations of traditional risk analysis when companies and economies are facing political uncertainty
So, it’s back. By which I mean no-deal Brexit rather than coronavirus. That we are still talking about the prospects of no deal less than three months before the end of the transition period, and nearly four and half years after the EU referendum, is a political failure of colossal scale, on both sides.
I have discussed the reasons for this failure elsewhere. As I have the long-term benefits of Brexit – for both the EU and the UK.
However, whether you agree with my views on Brexit or not, what I wanted to do here was use the Brexit negotiations, as well as some aspects of the response to the coronavirus crisis, to illustrate certain issues around the unintended or unforeseen consequences of political events and their possible analysis.
It is obvious that no deal, a skinny deal or even a late deal (after 31 December 2020) will increase the friction costs of Britain’s exit from the EU, irrespective of the long-term benefits.
As a firm, we have analysed these costs at length – across the portfolios and for new investments. And we have done so many times, practically continuously, since before the referendum in 2016 through to the last-minute scramble in 2019 to put in place the Withdrawal Agreement (and the transition period) and up to today. So, it is no co-incidence that our exposure to the direct effects of Brexit1 is small.
However, the unintended consequences of no deal are more difficult to analyse.
Take the British government’s Internal Market Bill. This is the proposed legislation dealing with the return of powers to the UK now that it is leaving the EU single market so as to ensure seamless internal trade between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Much of the recent media excitement is focused on its breach of the Irish Protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement. I would suggest that the real risks of a problem at the Irish border are low. The issues are well known, analysable and both the UK and Ireland are strongly motivated to resolve any difficulties that might arise. Arguably, the introduction of the offending safeguards in the Internal Market Bill arose because the government recognised the implications of the EU imposing a hard border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and that this was considered as great a threat to the peace process as the possibility of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. The concerns which apply to one border apply equally to the other, albeit that at the Irish border they are of more focus to nationalists and at the Irish Sea they are of more focus to the unionists.
The real risks of the Internal Market Bill – and of no-deal Brexit – lie elsewhere.
One is that they play to narratives of Scottish grievances against England and the case for independence. With the Internal Market Bill, the Scottish government claims it cuts across the devolution settlement, giving powers to Westminster that should be held within the devolved administrations (“Scots told what they can eat by England”). A similar grievance applies to Brexit itself – particularly if there is economic disruption following no deal – since a majority of Scots voted to Remain (“Scotland taken out of the EU against its will”). Also, since health is a devolved competence, the coronavirus pandemic has allowed Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish National Party’s First Minister of Scotland, to present herself as a credible head of government leading her people through a crisis. The result is a very significantly increased chance of a second referendum on Scottish independence in the near future, especially if the outcome of the elections to the Scottish Parliament in May 2021 is a large SNP majority.
What do we make of this? For an investment firm, the risks of the direct consequences of Scottish Independence are analysable and can be mitigated. We have looked at it before, in 2014, the year of the first referendum. The heightened risk of another is why we continue to be cautious on financing businesses with significant exposure to illiquid sterling assets in Scotland and why we have very little of this exposure in any of the portfolios today.
What could be other unforeseen consequences of no deal?
Take fishing for example. It is not hard to imagine violent clashes between continental and British fishermen in UK waters, perhaps even deaths, and that the situation could quickly escalate, to clumsy enforcement action by the Royal Navy or to blockades of channel ports by French fishermen.
How do we analyse the impact of these? I have no idea.
Were we in a better position in relation to the coronavirus? Not really. This time last year we had not even heard of it. So, we had never assessed the performance of our credits or potential investments against the risk of a pandemic or, more accurately, the possibility that governments around the world would shut down their economies in response to it.
Now that we have seen what a coronavirus pandemic involves, we have become adept at analysing its direct consequences: which credits are immune or benefit from it, which are adversely affected and, of those, the scale of their cash burn/releveraging from lock down, the potential earnings’ recovery curves which might materialise, our level of conviction in them and our consequential view of investibility.
Many of the unintended consequences of government responses to the crisis however are still too difficult to assess. For example, the real threat to the rule of law in Britain is probably not the Internal Market Bill but the arbitrary criminalisation of normally law-abiding citizens for spending time with their own families. This has become government by diktat, without any parliamentary scrutiny, and could lead to a systemic break down of law and order. Can we analyse that? No.
Each major political event then can be broken down into three categories.
First an analysis of its direct effects – every conscientious asset manager should be able to do that and articulate both an analytical framework and its results.
Second, you should think through possible unintended or unforeseen consequences of the event. Some of those risks are analysable and the investment process can take account of them (minimising exposure or pricing in the risk appropriately).
Some, the third category, are not analysable.
This should be no surprise. Stefan Zweig, that titan of 20th century European literature, observed that it is an iron law of history that those who will be caught up in the great movements determining the course of their own times always fail to recognise them in their early stages.
Which means it will not be possible to tell what kind of storm will clear the foul skies above us now.
King John’s storm began with the death of his mother, the Plantagenet matriarch, Eleanor of Aquitaine. It could start for us in any number of ways. A small-scale military confrontation between Britain and France overfishing. The break-up of the UK or Spain. A terrorist incident. The re-emergence of the migration crisis. No one knows.
The only thing you can do as a creditor to protect yourself against these unforeseen events is to structure your deals with ample headroom against underperformance, strong documents and a proper security package.
This is why we always run a material downside on each potential investment, starting the day after the relevant purchase date, to provide high conviction in capital preservation in the reasonable worst-case scenario. The particulars of the downside don’t matter; it is only the recovery of capital in those dire circumstances that does.
And that is how risk officers sleep at night.